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Landing the blame: The influence of EU Member States on quota setting 
 
Highlights 
 
x Total allowable catches (TACs) are a central tool for EU fisheries management. 
x On average, EU TACs were set 20% above scientific advice between 2001-2015. 
x Denmark and the UK received the largest increase to their TACs (in tonnes). 
x Spain and Portugal received the largest percentage increase to their TAC. 
x Greater transparency in decision-making is required. 
 
Abstract 
Fisheries in European Union (EU) waters have been managed under the Common Fisheries 
Policy since 1983. The main regulatory tool in EU fisheries management is the use of Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs). In principle, TACs are set according to biological scientific advice 
provided by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) which recommends 
catch limits with the objective of maximising catches in a sustainable manner. The objective 
of this paper is to compare TACs set by the EU and its Member States between 2001 and 
2015 with those recommended by ICES in their annual scientific advice in order to a) 
investigate the level of compliance with scientific advice by the European Council and, b) 
consider whether particular Member States have received more TACs above advice than 
others. For the time-series analysed, the European Council set TACs above scientific advice 
by an average of 20% per year, with around 7 out of every 10 TACs exceeding advice. Of all 
Member States, Denmark and the United Kingdom received the highest TACs in volume 
above scientific advice. Relative to the size of their TAC however, Spain and Portugal 
exceeded advice by the greatest percentage. Greater transparency is required to determine 
what takes place during the closed door negotiations and to improve the fishery sustainability 
credentials of the EU and its Member States. 
 
Keywords: Total allowable catch; Decision-making processes; Common Fisheries Policy; 
Political economy 
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1. Introduction 
Decades of overfishing in the European Union (EU) have led to depleted fish populations and 
billions of euros in lost economic potential [1-4]. EU fisheries are managed under the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP) which uses Total Allowable Catches (TACs) are its main regulatory 
tool. How TACs are decided and at what level they are set is therefore of key importance to 
delivering improved fisheries management in the EU. 
The CFP was established in 1983 in an effort to deal with complexities in management 
resulting from the shared nature of EU fish stocks and to address an increasing awareness of 
overfishing in EU waters. The 1983 regulation (EEC No 170/83) enshrined commitments to 
Exclusive Economic Zones, the concept of relative stability and established TACs as the main 
regulatory tool for EU fisheries management. The 1992 regulation (EEC No 3760/92) created 
structural measures to deal with fishing overcapacity and set up a licensing system. The 2002 
regulation (EC No 2371/2002) saw the creation of multi-annual recovery and management 
plans, and the creation of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), collectives of regional 
stakeholders including industry representatives and environmental groups, to account for the 
geographic diversity of fisheries and to facilitate management input from a diverse group of 
stakeholders. Most recently, the CFP celebrated its 30th anniversary in 2013 with the latest 
round of reforms (EU No 1380/2013) which included a discard ban and a commitment and 
timeline to achieving maximum sustainable yield by 2015 where possible and 2020 at the 
latest. These recent reforms (2002 and 2013) recognised that achieving maximum sustainable 
yield targets requires the management of fish stocks according to the best available science 
and affirmed the commitment of Member States to sustainable fishing [5, 6]. 
Throughout the history of the CFP, TACs have remained the main regulatory tool of the CFP. 
The objective of TACs is to deliver sustainable fisheries while extracting as much of the 
resource as possible [7, 8]. Nonetheless, despite reforms every decade designed to adapt 
management to changing socio-economic and environmental conditions, researchers have 
repeatedly drawn attention to WKH&)3¶V failures (e.g.  [5, 9-15]). Many studies have linked the 
failure of the CFP to lead to stock recovery to problems with the implementation of the TAC 
management system, particularly with how scientific advice is treated [5, 11, 16-21]. Biais [16] 
found that between 1984 and 1992 there was good compliance with scientific advice only 
when proposed changes to TACs were small. Karagiannakos [11] and Patterson and 
Résimont [18] found that landings corresponded more with fish stock biomass than TACs, and 
the systematic disregard for scientific advice when it comes to setting TACs in the EU has 
been found across multiple stocks and timeframes [17, 19-21].  
Recently the first signs of improvements in fish stocks have been documented in the EU 
waters [22-24] with 39% of assessed stocks in the Northeast Atlantic now considered to be 
within safe biological limits and 52% to be fished sustainably [25]. Yet while a stock recovery 
process is underway, European waters are still well below their economic potential. In addition, 
recent stock improvements may only be for closely monitored fish stocks under quota 
management, as the status of non-quota fish stocks, particularly those in Mediterranean, is 
still worsening [26-29].  
In principle, TACs are set according to scientific advice provided by the International Council 
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee 
on Fisheries. The former undertake annual stock assessments for the most important 
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commercial stocks, assess the biological status of species and recommend catch limits with 
the objective of achieving maximum sustainable yield [30], while the latter focus on the 
economic and social impacts of implementing TAC packages. Prior to formulating a draft 
proposal the European Commission (EC) then consult with RACs. Finally, the EC then 
negotiates with third countries (non-EU states with a vested interest in relevant stocks) through 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations prior to finalising the proposal for 
consideration by fisheries ministers. Third countries include Iceland, the Faroe Islands, 
Norway and, to a smaller extent, other countries such as the Russian Federation. Based on 
this information, fisheries ministers of EU Member States then set the legally binding TACs 
over three days of discussion every year. As different Member States have vested interests in 
different stocks depending on historical fishing rights (upheld through WKHSULQFLSDORIµrelative 
stability¶EDVHGRQKLVWRULFDOFDWFKHV), TACs for different stocks are subject to discussions with 
different groups of ministers. The EU TAC is then divided between Member States according 
to relative stability, although quota swapping is commonplace after EU TACs, and each 
Member States¶ proportion, are agreed [31].  
To our knowledge all time-series studies to date have only considered the relationship 
between scientific advice and the final TAC set for the whole of the EU. Therefore, this paper 
investigates not only how closely ministers across the EU are following biological (i.e. ICES) 
scientific advice and whether more recent decisions are more closely heeding such advice, 
but also whether particular Member States influence decision-making more than others. This 
follows the approach developed by Esteban and Carpenter [32-34] in analysing the 2015 
TACs. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data collection method used to 
collect data on approximately 200 TACs per year across 15 years (2001-2015) totalling 3000 
individual EU TAC decisions and analysis undertaken. Section 3 presents the results of the 
analysis between advised and agreed TACs and the influence of EU and non-EU Member 
States on the probability of setting higher TACs when a given country is included in the 
negotiation of TACs. Section 4 discusses the main management implications of the results.  
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Data collection and preparation 
Data on ICES scientific advice regarding TACs were obtained from the ICES Advice web portal 
(www.ices.dk). TACs allocated to the EU as a whole and across Member States were 
extracted from Council Regulations hosted on the EUROLEX (www.eur-lex.europa.eu) and 
FAOLEX (www.faolex.fao.org) online legal databases. At present there is no European or 
national authority that compiles data for third country agreements. Separate searches for 
these agreements were therefore undertaken of grey literature sources including news articles 
and government agency websites. Where no third country agreement was identified through 
searches or was successfully negotiated, the EU TAC was calculated based on the historical 
average allocated to the EU for years where an agreement was reached. For most stocks the 
share of the total TAC held by the EU remains fairly consistent with a range of a couple 
percentage points. Data were extracted for the 15-year period between 2001 and 2015 and 
the full dataset is provided in Annex I of the Supplementary Material.  
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In total, data were collected for approximately 200 TAC decisions per year (one decision 
counts as one record of scientific advice and one legally agreed TAC) covering 47 fish species 
(see Annex I and Table A.1 of the Supplementary Material). Note that in any one year the 
number of TACs may differ due to incomplete time-series for particular TACs resulting either 
from new species coming under TAC management or alterations to the areas for which 
particular TACs are set over time. EU Member States considered in this study include Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 2004 accession countries 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) are only assessed from 2004-2015. In total, data on 
approximately 3000 EU-wide TAC decisions were gathered, covering approximately 12,000 
Member State TAC sub-divisions with around half (1500 and 6000 respectively) that can be 
compared to relevant ICES advice.  
In order to enable data comparisons between years, advice provided in number of individuals 
(e.g. Atlantic salmon) was converted to tonnes and where ICES provided a range for its TAC 
advice, the average was taken. In addition, adjustments were required in order to match ICES 
areas to TAC areas where these areas differ. No open-source description of how the EU 
matches scientific advice is available and formal requests for this information from the EU 
Commission to clarify it were unsuccessful. Consequently, where the ICES area is split across 
multiple TAC areas it was assumed that the advice is split in equal proportion amongst the 
TAC areas. Full details of all adjustments made to the raw data are provided in Annex I of the 
Supplementary material.  
In instances where no TAC was agreed with third countries, all country level TACs were 
summed to reach a total unilateral TAC (e.g. mackerel 2010-2014) as reported by ICES in the 
advice files. Where no agreements between third countries and the EU were either reached 
or identified from searches, the EU share of the total TAC was estimated based on the average 
EU share for years where a TAC agreement was reached. For blue whiting however, a more 
conservative EU share of the total TAC was used for years 2001-2005 based on the relative 
share set in the 2006 agreement (30.5%) rather than the average share between 2006-2015 
(19%) in order to ensure results were not unduly affected by the large TAC for this species. 
2.2 Data analysis 
Average excess TAC was calculated for the EU as a whole and for each EU Member State 
between 2001 and 2015. The excess TAC is defined here as the amount by which the agreed 
TAC set by ministers exceeds scientific advice produced by ICES. The excess TAC was 
calculated in tonnes by subtracting the TAC advised by ICES from the agreed TAC for the 
EU1. For each Member State, ICES advice was allocated bDVHG RQ WKDW 0HPEHU 6WDWH¶V
proportion of the total EU TAC in that year. Excess TAC for each Member State was then 
calculated by subtracting the (allocated) TAC advised by ICES from the agreed TAC for the 
Member State. 
Where the agreed TAC was set at or below ICES advice this is recorded as a decision taken 
in accordance with ICES advice (i.e. a difference of zero) as the TAC recommended is a limit 
rather than a specific target. In practice, having one fish stock at a very high biomass level or 
with very low fishing mortality does not necessarily aid in the recovery and sustainable 
                                                          
1 For example, if ICES advised a TAC of 4,900 t and the agreed TAC was 10,000 t, the excess TAC would be 
5,100 t. 
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management of other stocks. With certain ecosystem dynamics and predator±prey 
relationships, the opposite may be the case [35]. 
Excess TAC was also calculated as a percentage above ICES advice for some of the analysis. 
The percentage excess TAC for each Member State and for the EU between 2001 and 2015 
was calculated by summing the excess TAC in tonnes across all TAC decisions for the entire 
time period and then dividing this excess TAC amount by the total ICES advice in tonnes over 
the whole period and multiplying by 100. This calculation acts to weight the percentage excess 
TAC according to the size of the TAC, thereby taking into account that some TACs are 
thousands of times larger than others. An advantage of calculating the excess TAC by overall 
volume is it removes the problem previous studies have had in instances where ICES advice 
was a TAC of zero (moratorium). When calculated by percentage difference, any TAC set 
where advice was zero would be infinitely higher than advice; consequently, these studies 
have arbitrarily set these decisions to be 100% above scientific advice (e.g. [17, 20]).  
Excess TAC by ecoregion was calculated in the same manner as Member State TAC, i.e. 
calculating the total volume of TAC above ICES advice in tonnes and converting this to a 
percentage of advice. This calculation allows for a geographic analysis of the results. 
ICES advice was also analysed to determine whether some Member States were being 
indirectly advised to reduce their TAC from the previous year to a greater extent. For example, 
ICES may advise a reduced TAC for a particular fish stock but the burden of implementing 
this reduction would fall to one Member State more than another due to the relative proportions 
of that TAC assigned to different States. Advised ICES changes (both increases and 
decreases) IURPWKHSUHYLRXV\HDU¶Vagreed TAC were calculated by determining the change 
between each Member States share in ICES advice in year t for each species in each 
management area and each Member States agreed TAC from year t
-1. Note that where data 
for previous years TACs were not presented, the change could not be determined and 
therefore these data were excluded from this analysis, along with TAC increases. Advised 
changes were then summed across all species and management areas for each Member 
State and averaged by the number of years each State is represented in the time-series. 
3. Results 
3.1 Differences between advised and agreed TACs  
On average, the European Council set TACs above scientific advice by 471,490 tonnes per 
year between 2001 and 2015. This equates to an average excess of 20% per year. Trends in 
decision-making indicate that scientific advice has been more closely followed in later years 
with a decrease in EU TACs set above scientific advice from 33% in 2001 to 7% in 2015 
(Figure 1). However, the number of TACs set above scientific advice across the EU has 
remained consistent at approximately 7 out of every 10 TACs set (Figure A.1 of the 
Supplementary Material) indicating that, in general, TACs set over scientific advice are 
decreasing to fall more in line with advice (42% to 18%, see Figure A.2). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
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Analysing the results by species shows that some species are set above ICES advice by much 
greater amounts. By volume, blue whiting, horse mackerel, mackerel, sprat, herring and cod 
make up approximately 80% of the excess TAC between 2001 and 2015. The contribution of 
species to the excess TAC in tonnes each year is shown in Figure A.4. The top 20 species 
ranked by excess TAC are listed in Table A.3.  
3.2 Excess TACs by Member States 
In terms of volume, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Spain accounted for just under half of 
WKH(8¶VH[FHVV7$&EHWZHHQDQG (Figure 2). By percentage difference, Spain 
and Portugal obtained TACs the most above scientific advice (37%). Finland and Estonia 
receive the smallest amounts of excess TAC, although TACs are still over advice (10% and 
12% respectively). This ranking also roughly aligns with the likelihood that a Member State 
will be part of negotiations that result in an excess TAC (See Table A.2). 
From 2001 to 2015 nearly all Member States have a reduction in their excess TACs with the 
exception of the Baltic States (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) who have no clear trend in 
excess TAC since their ascension to the EU in 2004 (See Figure A.5). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 
3.3 Geographical trends 
There is a clear geographic trend in excess TACs with Western Member States receiving 
TACs in greater excess of scientific advice compared to Member States in the Baltic region. 
A similar geographical pattern emerges when excess TAC is calculated for the major fishing 
areas in the Northeast Atlantic, grouped by ICES ecoregion (Figure 3).  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 
3.4 ICES advised TAC change by Member State 
Between 2001 and 2015, ICES provided advice which would require Spain and Portugal to 
reduce their TACs the most and Member States around the Baltic Sea the least (Table 1). 
Moreover, ICES advice enabled some Member States (Denmark, France and Finland) to 
increase their TACs on average. 
Rankings of Member States by average percentage excess TAC and by the amount of change 
in TAC that ICES advice corresponds to are similar (Table 1), with a significant negative 
relationship between the percentage excess TAC obtained by each State and the percentage 
change advised by ICES (r2=0.56, p<0.05, Figure A.3). Nonetheless, there are differences to 
be highlighted: Lithuania and Latvia have lower excess TACs given the ICES advised change 
in TAC while France, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Germany have larger excess TACs.  
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
3.5 Influence of third countries 
While a paucity of data prevents substantial analyses, TACs in which third countries were 
involved (where the combined third country is large, i.e. above 33%) were set with a greater 
amount above scientific advice, on average by 24% (Table 2). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
4. Discussion 
On average, EU TACs were set 20% above scientific advice between 2001 and 2015, 
comparable to findings of previous studies [17, 20]. In recent years the level by which TAC 
are set above scientific advice has fallen. With the number of TACs set above scientific advice 
(7 out of every 10 set) remaining consistent this indicates that TACs are being brought more 
in line with scientific advice.  
In the EU, marine capture fisheries are worth ¼ELOOion and employ approximately 145,000 
people [36]. The total fish catch in 2013 was 4.7 million tonnes with the majority used directly 
for human consumption [37]. Fisheries in the EU, as well as globally, are therefore of huge 
socio-economic importance. This importance has often led to socio-economic considerations 
taking precedence over biological ones in discussions regarding TACs. Even last year, the UK 
fisheries minister George Eustice stated that ³[a]lthough these were difficult negotiations, I am 
pleased that we were able to secure the best possible deal to ensure sustainable fisheries and 
a strong UK fishing industry. While fishermen had feared there would be major cuts, we were 
able to keep the same quota as last year for many species, in addition to important increases 
to the North Sea cod and haddock quota, which will benefit Scottish ILVKHUPHQ´2. The Rt. Hon. 
-RKQ*XPPHUDSUHYLRXV8.ILVKHULHVPLQLVWHUSXWLWEHVW³>W@KHDUJXPHQWV>DERXW7$&V@DUH
not about conservation, unless of course you are arguing about aQRWKHUFRXQWU\¶¶ [38].  
Understandably, reducing TACs is difficult for EU ministers because in that year it directly 
negatively affects those working in the fisheries sector of their country and is therefore both 
socio-economically and politically unfavourable. The declining trends of excess TACs indicate 
that in the last fifteen years, EU ministers have slowly been bringing quotas in line with 
VFLHQWLILFDGYLFHDQGWKDWZKLOHILVKHULHVPLQLVWHUVZLOOFODLPVXFFHVVIRUWKHLUFRXQWU\¶VILVKHULHV
and fishers each year, reductions are being made.  
Because of the principle of relative stability, Member States are only able to increase their 
TACs if either (i) the EU TAC is increased or (ii) an agreement can be made with another 
                                                          
2 +DUYH\)	1HOVHQ$)LVKLQJTXRWDVGHI\VFLHQWLVWV¶DGYLFH7KH*XDUGLDQ'HFHPEHU
2014. [online] http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/16/fishing-quotas-defy-
scientistsadvice [accessed 07/10/2015] 
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country. In the case of the former, all countries that have a share of the EU TAC receive the 
same percentage increase to their agreed TAC however this will translate into different tonnes 
due to their proportional share. Consequently, it is of interest to note which countries benefitted 
(i.e. were subsequently able to land a greater volume of fish) the most from EU TACs being 
set above scientific advice as, we believe, it is likely that these countries will have lobbied for 
the greater EU TAC. 
While Spain and Portugal receive the greatest excess TACs in terms of percentage, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom receive the most in terms of volume, each obtaining quotas on 
average by an excess of over 75,000 tonnes between 2001 and 2015 (Figure 2). With Spain 
included, these three countries accounted for approximately half (47%) RIWKH(8¶VH[FHVV
TAC between 2001 and 2015, a share of volume just under to the total TAC received by these 
Member States (calculated from the database as 54%).  
When these trends were analysed at Member State level, differences in the excess TAC 
received by Member States were found with a west (highest excess TAC) to east (lowest) 
trend in country rankings (Table 2 and Figure 3). In general, the greater the required reduction 
to bring TACs in line with scientific advice, the greater the excess TAC received by a Member 
State, although there is variation in this measure (Table 2, Figure A.3). Spain and Portugal 
topped the league table (Figure 2) with the largest percentage of excess TAC (37% over ICES 
advice on average between 2001 and 2015) however scientific advice was provided for EU 
TACs which, based on the proportion of EU TACs allocated to them, would have required 
them to reduce their TACs the most. This finding presents a situation where Member States 
are acting in a short-term cycle of exceeding advice, delaying stock recovery and having 
advised TAC reductions continue. This raises the question of whether Member States 
benefitting that year from larger excess TACs are benefitting in the longer-term. With the latter 
perspective, it may be the case that Member States negotiating larger TACs for their stocks 
are not benefitting at all [20]. 
Nonetheless, even these countries show improvement over time indicating incremental 
reductions (albeit subject to variability between years) in excess TAC (Figure A.5). While the 
relationship between the reductions required by Member States to bring EU TACs in line with 
scientific advice and the excess TAC explains some of the trend in results, some Member 
States (e.g. the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium) have comparatively larger 
excess TACs given the required reduction arising from advice. Accordingly, other factors than 
simply the burden of implementing advice require further consideration. 
The western-eastern trend identified between the ranking of a Member State and their excess 
TAC indicates that geographical, ecological and socio-economic factors play a role in the level 
of excess TAC received (Figure 3). Consequently, further work should examine causality 
between these factors including, but not limited to, the biological status of stocks in each area, 
the high socioeconomic dependence on fishing activities in some countries, the number and 
nature of stakeholders involved in decision-making, the type of stocks different Member States 
have interest in (i.e. are widely migratory stocks more prone to TACs being set above advice 
than less mobile stocks). 
4.1 The influence of third countries in negotiations 
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The role of third countries is an important consideration when discussing EU TACs. These 
third countries (e.g. the Faroe Islands, Iceland, Norway and Russia) bring additional 
stakeholders to the negotiations with vested interests. However, unlike European Council 
negotiations, it is not uncommon for third countries to leave or avoid negotiations altogether 
and set their own chosen TAC unilaterally ± PRVWQRWDEO\ LQ WKHSURORQJHG µPDFNHUHOZDU¶
between the EU and Norway and Iceland [39].  
The EC proposal for TACs has been shown to be higher than ICES advice as third countries 
are incorporated [20]. Findings from this study indicate that TAC negotiations involving third 
countries are more likely to be set above ICES advice (Table 2). Consequently, incorporating 
third countries into these analyses could result in these countries topping the league tables 
although the order of EU Member States would simply be shifted downwards rather than 
changed. However, due to the lack of a centralised database on these decisions, incomplete 
data prevented this analysis.  
4.2 Increasing transparency of the quota setting process 
Transparency and openness are fundamental concepts to good governance enshrined in 
$UWLFOH³GHFLVLRQVVKDOOEHWDNHQDVRSHQO\DQGDVFORVHO\DVSRVVLEOHWRWKHFLWL]HQ´DQG
$UWLFOH ³WKH8QLRQ LQVWLWXWLRQVERGLHVRIILFHVDQGDJHQFLHVVKDOOFRQGXFW WKHLUZRUNDV
RSHQO\DVSRVVLEOH´RIWKH7UHDWy of the European Union (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty). 
However, EU TACs are still decided behind closed doors with discussions remaining secret 
and while annual ICES advice and EU TACs are published online, difficulties in aligning ICES 
advice areas with TAC management areas present obstacles to both openness and 
transparency. In addition, having no centralised database documenting outcomes from 
negotiations with third countries ensures the effects of these discussions are opaque and 
closed.  
Greater transparency in the EU TAC decision-making process would therefore include, 
amongst others, the alignment of ICES advice and TAC management areas, the result of third 
country negotiations, more streamlined access to historical and future TAC decisions and, 
more fundamentally, opening annual negotiations to the public. This paper has used the 
results of these negotiations to estimate the Member States who are most responsible for 
raising TACs above scientific advice. The only way to verify these outcomes is with greater 
transparency in process. 
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5. Conclusions 
The significant gap between the levels of TACs recommended in scientific advice and agreed 
by the European Council indicates the prevalence of short-term concerns over the long-term 
sustainability of fishery resources during the last decades. On average, the European Council 
set TACs above scientific advice by 20% per year and throughout the time period 
approximately 7 out of every 10 TACs were set above advice. However, trends indicate that 
the level by which TACs are set above scientific advice is falling and that TACs are being 
brought more in line with scientific recommendations ± a positive trend occurring alongside 
signs of stock recovery in some EU waters. 
Increasing transparency of the EU TAC decision-making process would improve not only the 
reputation of the European Commission in civil society but would also help to align the long-
term interests of the fisheries sector with ICES advice. The CFP reform in 2013 opened new 
opportunities to navigate into sustainable and resilient pathways to ensure the ecological, 
economic and social contributions of fish stocks for the fisheries sector into the future. 
Although these findings indicate some important progress has been achieved during the last 
15 years, it is essential for the gap between scientific advice and TACs to continue to narrow 
to ensure the sustainability of EU fisheries. While all Member States are contributing to EU 
excess TACs, these findings show some States are having greater influence than others. To 
improve fishery sustainability credentials of the EU and its Member States, and ensure 
scientifically appropriate quotas, principles of transparency and openness need to be adopted.  
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Tables 
Table 1: ,&(6DGYLVHGFKDQJHIURPWKHSUHYLRXV\HDUV¶7$&by Member State compared with 
the ranking of Member States by percentage excess TAC (2001-2015).  
Member State ICES 
advised 
TAC change 
(tonnes) 
ICES 
advised 
TAC 
change (%) 
Level of 
advised 
change 
(ranking) 
Excess 
TAC 
(ranking) 
Ranking 
difference 
Spain -41,016 -23 2 1 1 
United Kingdom -36,028 -9 11 6 5 
The Netherlands -25,492 -14 3 3 0 
Ireland -24,301 -14 4 4 0 
Sweden -24,224 -12 6 7 -1 
Portugal -16,348 -24 1 2 -1 
Germany -14,842 -10 9 5 4 
Poland -11,931 -10 10 13 -3 
Latvia -6,968 -12 7 12 -5 
Estonia -5,886 -8 12 14 -2 
Lithuania -2,985 -12 5 11 -6 
Belgium -2,962 -12 8 10 -2 
Finland 1,886 2 14 15 -1 
France 4,123 2 15 8 7 
Denmark 5,570 1 13 9 4 
 
 
Table 2: Excess TAC split by third country share 
 
Third country share 
Excess TAC 
(tonnes) Excess TAC (%) 
Large combined third country 
share (>33%) 181,808 24 
Small combined third country 
share (<33%) 289,682 19 
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Figures  
 
Figure 1: Annual excess TAC (%) between 2001 and 2015 set by the European Council. 
 
Figure 2: Average excess TAC for each Member State between 2001 and 2015. For each 
Member State the grey column represents the total advised TAC by ICES in tonnes across all 
stocks and the black column represents the total amount by which TACs were above advice. 
The entire column represents the agreed TAC. Labels represent the percentage excess TAC. 
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Figure 3: Average excess TAC for each ecoregion between 2001 and 2015. For each 
ecoregion the grey bubble represents the total advised TAC by ICES in tonnes across all 
stocks and the black border represents the total percentage by which TACs were above 
advice. The size of the entire bubble represents the agreed TAC (in tonnes) in that 
ecoregion. Labels indicate the name of each ecoregion and the average percentage excess 
TAC for that ecoregion. Greyscale indicates the ranking of Member States by excess TAC 
(%) with black showing countries with the greatest excess TAC and light grey the least, 
percentages are reported on Figure 2. 
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Figure A.1: Percentage (black line) and number of TACs above ICES advice (dark grey 
bars) and TACs for which there is ICES advice (light grey bars) between 2001 and 2015 
across the EU. 
 
 
Figure A.2: Percentage by which EU TACs exceed scientific advice between 2001 and 
2015. Note only data for TACs where ICES advice is exceeded are included. 
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Figure A.3: Excess TAC and ICES advised TAC change by Member State 
 
 
Figure A.4: Species composition of excess TAC. The layers represent the top six species 
(blue whiting [light blue], horse mackerel [orange], mackerel [light grey], sprat [yellow], 
herring [dark blue], cod [green]) and all other species [dark grey]). 
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Figure A.5: Annual excess TAC from 2001 to 2015 of (a) Western European Member States 
(Spain [gold], Portugal [green]) (b) Northern European Member States (The Netherlands 
[orange], Ireland [green], Germany [black], UK [red], France [blue], Belgium [yellow]), (c) 
Nordic Member States (Sweden [gold], Denmark [red], Finland [blue]) and (d) Baltic Member 
States (Lithuania [green], Latvia [maroon], Poland [red], Estonia [blue]). Note the different y-
axis scales. Excess TAC can be calculated to be in excess of 100% if the agreed TAC is 
more than twice as large as advice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A.1: Species managed by TACs in the EU and included in analyses 
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Species name Latin name 
Alfonsinos Beryx spp. 
Anchovy Engraulis encrasicolus 
Anglerfish Lophiidae 
Atlantic halibut* Hippoglossus hippoglossus  
Atlantic salmon Salmo salar 
Basking shark* Cetorhinus maximus 
Black scabbardfish Aphanopus carbo 
Blue ling Molva dypterygia 
Blue whiting Micromesistius poutassou 
Boarfish Caproidae 
Capelin Mallotus villosus  
Cod Gadus morhua 
Dab Limanda limanda 
Deep-sea sharks* Selachimorpha 
Forkbeards Phycis blennoides 
Great silver smelt Argentina silus 
Greenland halibut* Reinhardtius hippoglossoides 
Haddock Melanogrammus aeglefinus 
Hake Merluccius merluccius 
Herring Clupea harengus 
Horse mackerel Trachurus spp. 
Lemon sole Microstomus kitt 
Ling Molva molva 
Mackerel Scomber scombrus 
Megrims Lepidorhombus spp. 
Northern prawn Pandalus borealis 
Norway lobster Nephrops norvegicus 
Norway pout Trisopterus esmarkii 
Orange roughy Hoplostethus atlanticus  
Penaeus shrimps* Penaeus spp. 
Plaice Pleuronectes platessa 
Pollack Pollachius pollachius 
Porbeagle Lamna nasus 
Red seabream Pagellus bogaraveo 
Redfish Sebastes spp. 
Roundnose grenadier Coryphaenoides rupestris 
Saithe Pollachius virens 
Sandeel Ammodytes spp. 
Skates and rays Rajiformes 
Snow crab* Chionoecetes spp 
Sole Solea solea / Solea spp. 
Spiny dogfish Squalus acanthias 
Sprat Sprattus sprattus 
Swordfish Xiphias gladius 
Turbot Psetta maxima 
Tusk Brosme brosme 
Whiting Merlangius merlangus 
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Species name Latin name 
*No ICES advice available for analysis 
 
Table A.2: Average excess TAC by quantity and likelihood 2001-2015 
Member States 
 Excess TAC 
(tonnes)  Excess TAC (%) 
Likelihood of 
Excess TAC 
Denmark 89,943 17% 0.63 
United Kingdom 77,077 20% 0.64 
Spain 53,367 37% 0.70 
The Netherlands 43,401 26% 0.60 
Ireland 38,297 24% 0.67 
France 33,775 18% 0.67 
Sweden 32,538 18% 0.61 
Germany 30,626 22% 0.57 
Poland 20,116 14% 0.46 
Portugal 15,892 37% 0.73 
Finland 11,473 10% 0.57 
Latvia 9,655 14% 0.69 
Estonia 8,209 12% 0.65 
Lithuania 3,100 14% 0.53 
Belgium 2,849 16% 0.64 
EU 471,490 20% 0.69 
 
Table A.3: Average excess TAC by species 2001-2015 (Top 20) 
Species Excess 
TAC 
(tonnes) 
Excess 
TAC (%) 
Blue whiting 91,726 52 
Horse mackerel 71,553 45 
Mackerel 68,925 22 
Sprat 65,399 16 
Herring 59,324 12 
Cod 40,288 45 
Plaice 9,263 12 
Hake 8,762 19 
Anchovy 8,713 54 
Whiting 8,626 36 
Norway lobster 8,189 15 
Megrims 6,327 37 
Haddock 3,777 9 
Anglerfish 3,732 14 
Redfish 2,969 30 
Common sole 2,514 11 
Pollack 1,968 194 
Northern prawn 1,665 33 
Blue ling 1,458 3 
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Species Excess 
TAC 
(tonnes) 
Excess 
TAC (%) 
Ling 1,454 18 
 
 
 
